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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
  ____________ 
 
No. 11-3519 
____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
ERIC SEIGLER, 
 
                                      Appellant 
____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 10-cr-00059-3) 
District Judge:  Honorable John E. Jones, III 
____________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
May 24, 2012 
 
Before:  RENDELL, FUENTES and HARDIMAN, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed:  May 30, 2012) 
____________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
 
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge. 
 Eric Seigler appeals his judgment of conviction and sentence following a 
conditional plea of guilty to the charge of being a felon in possession of a firearm in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).  We will affirm. 
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I 
 Because we write for the parties, who are well acquainted with the case, we recite 
only the essential facts and procedural history. 
 Seigler was seated on the passenger’s side of the back seat of a two-door blue 
Oldsmobile when it was pulled over by Pennsylvania State Police Corporal Sean Taylor 
and Trooper Rodney Fink.  Taylor and Fink were operating as a roving DUI unit shortly 
after 2:00 a.m. when they spotted the car.  After deciding to follow the vehicle, Taylor 
and Fink observed it weave and cross over the double yellow center lines three times 
within the span of a mile.  Suspecting that the driver was intoxicated, Taylor and Fink 
activated their lights and the car pulled to the side of the road.  As they made the stop, 
they learned that the vehicle’s registered owner was on parole. 
 Taylor exited his squad car and approached the Oldsmobile on the driver’s side 
while Fink acted as “cover” near the rear passenger’s side of the car.  Three men were 
inside.  As Taylor approached the car’s driver and registered owner, Shawn Davis, he 
noticed a switchblade on Davis’s lap.  Taylor notified Fink that there was a knife in the 
car.  Davis tried to hand the knife to Taylor, but Taylor ordered him to drop the weapon 
and step out of the vehicle.  Taylor handcuffed Davis, directed him to the rear of the 
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vehicle where Fink was waiting, and removed the switchblade from the car.1
 Taylor then proceeded to the passenger’s side of the car, where Dalontay Barnes 
was sitting in the front seat.  Taylor ordered Barnes from the vehicle, cuffed him, and sent 
him to Fink at the rear of the car.  After Barnes exited, Taylor noticed what appeared to 
be the butt of a handgun protruding from a yellow bag between the front seats.  He made 
no mention of the gun to Fink because he did not wish to alert Seigler—who remained 
unsecured in the car—to his knowledge of the gun. 
 
 Taylor then asked Seigler to step out of the car.  Because Seigler was sitting in the 
back seat of a two-door car, the front passenger’s seat had to be folded forward to allow 
him to exit the vehicle.  As that occurred, Taylor noticed yet another gun, which had been 
under the front passenger’s seat, on the floor of the back seat.  Taylor cuffed Seigler and 
directed him to the rear of the car, and then he removed both guns from the vehicle.  In 
the yellow bag, Taylor also found “four bandannas, a gray knit cap, a Cobra two-way 
radio, a black pair of gloves, and on the passenger floor [he found] . . . a night vision 
scope, a pair of binoculars, and a digital camera.”  (App. 69.)  He also noticed a pair of 
gloves and three black hoodies in the back seat. 
                                                 
1 At the suppression hearing, Taylor and Fink provided partially contradictory 
testimony regarding the sequence of events during the stop.  The inconsistencies included 
their accounts of who seized the knife and how.  Taylor testified that he removed the 
knife from the car as he was securing Davis, while Fink testified that he asked the front 
passenger to hand him the knife while Taylor was bringing Davis to the rear of the 
vehicle.  The District Court nevertheless found both officers credible, and Seigler does 
not contest that finding on appeal. 
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 Once outside the vehicle, all three men confessed to having a criminal history.  
They were eventually Mirandized and arrested, but the record does not clearly reveal 
when the arrests occurred. 
 A grand jury indicted Seigler, Davis, and Barnes (collectively, Defendants) for 
conspiracy to unlawfully possess a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 371 & 922(g)(1), 
(j), unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), and 
possession of a stolen firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(j).  Defendants moved to 
suppress the physical and testimonial evidence obtained during the stop.  After holding a 
hearing and receiving post-hearing briefs, the District Court denied the motions.  Seigler 
reached a conditional plea agreement with the Government in which he reserved the right 
to appeal the denial of the suppression motion.  He then pleaded guilty to one count of 
being a felon in possession of a firearm.  The District Court sentenced Seigler to 72 
months’ imprisonment and three years of supervised release.  Seigler timely filed a notice 
of appeal. 
II 
 We review factual findings following a suppression hearing for clear error, but we 
apply a plenary standard of review to the District Court’s legal conclusions.  United States 
v. Lewis, 672 F.3d 232, 236–37 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing United States v. Tracey, 597 F.3d 
140, 146 (3d Cir. 2010)).  Seigler contends that the suppression motion should have been 
granted for three reasons: (1) there was no reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle, (2) 
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there was no probable cause to seize him, and (3) the search of the car was unlawful. 
A 
 An officer may stop a vehicle pursuant to Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), when 
the officer has an objectively reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is occurring.  
Lewis, 672 F.3d at 237.  “Once a valid traffic stop is initiated, ‘an officer who develops a 
reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity may expand the scope of an inquiry 
beyond the reason for the stop and detain the vehicle and its occupants for further 
investigation.’”  Id. (quoting United States v. Givan, 320 F.3d 452, 458 (3d Cir. 2003)).  
To determine whether an officer possessed an objectively reasonable suspicion, we look 
to the totality of the circumstances.  See United States v. Nelson, 284 F.3d 472, 481 (3d 
Cir. 2002). 
 Pennsylvania law prohibits the operation of a vehicle while under the influence of 
“a sufficient amount of alcohol such that the individual is rendered incapable of safely 
driving.”  75 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 3802(a)(1).  Taylor and Fink were on a roving DUI patrol 
in the early morning hours when they saw the Oldsmobile weaving in its lane and 
crossing the double yellow center line three times within the span of a mile.  Such erratic 
driving creates reasonable suspicion that the operator is driving under the influence.  See 
Amundsen v. Jones, 533 F.3d 1192, 1198–99 (10th Cir. 2008).  In addition, “[a] police 
officer who observes a violation of state traffic laws may lawfully stop the car committing 
the violation.”  United States v. Bonner, 363 F.3d 213, 216 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing 
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Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 109 (1977)); see Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 
806, 819 (1996) (holding that where “officers ha[ve] probable cause to believe [a 
defendant] ha[s] violated the traffic code[,] . . . [a] stop [is] reasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment”).  Pennsylvania requires a driver to drive his vehicle “as nearly as 
practicable entirely within a single lane,” 75 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 3309(1), which Davis did 
not do.  Thus the initial stop was justified. 
 Once the officers spotted the switchblade—the possession of which may have been 
a parole violation for Davis—and later the handguns, the focus of the stop shifted, 
making the individual detentions reasonable under the circumstances.  Accordingly, the 
entirety of the Terry stop was legal. 
B 
 Turning to his second argument, Seigler confuses the requirements for arrest with 
those for seizure during an automotive Terry stop.  See Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 
249, 257–60, 263 (2007) (differentiating seizure of a passenger during a traffic stop from 
“formal arrest”).  While an arrest requires probable cause, e.g., Atwater v. City of Lago 
Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354 (2001), police officers are permitted to order the occupants from 
a vehicle without any particularized suspicion during a legal stop, Bonner, 363 F.3d at 
216.  The Constitution also allows officers to reasonably detain and even handcuff those 
occupants without probable cause to protect the officers’ safety.  See Arizona v. Johnson, 
555 U.S. 323, 331–32 (2009); Brendlin, 551 U.S. at 258; United States v. Johnson, 592 
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F.3d 442, 447–48 (3d Cir. 2010) (“[P]lacing a suspect in handcuffs while securing a 
location or conducting an investigation [does not] automatically transform an otherwise-
valid Terry stop into a full-blown arrest.”).  Taylor testified that he handcuffed the three 
occupants solely for his own and Fink’s safety—but he did not arrest them at first—as he 
progressively learned of the weapons in the vehicle, knowing full well that Davis may 
have violated his parole and that the occupants outnumbered the officers three to two.  
Once Taylor saw that a firearm had been concealed at Seigler’s feet and learned that 
Seigler had a criminal history, there was probable cause to believe that Seigler had 
illegally possessed the firearm.  Therefore, neither the initial detention nor the ultimate 
arrest was contrary to the Fourth Amendment. 
C 
 Finally, Seigler contends that the weapons should have been suppressed as the fruit 
of a warrantless search.  But Seigler, who was not the owner of the vehicle and therefore 
had no reasonable expectation of privacy in it, lacks standing to challenge the search.  
United States v. Mosley, 454 F.3d 249, 252–53 (3d Cir. 2006).  Moreover, even if he had 
such an expectation, the seizure of the guns was permissible for two reasons.  First, the 
guns were in plain view from Taylor’s lawful vantage point outside of the vehicle.  See 
Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 134–42 (1990) (explaining that officers who have not 
violated the Fourth Amendment in coming to a certain location may seize evidence that 
immediately appears to be incriminating).  Second, the search of the vehicle incident to its 
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occupants’ arrests was legal because the guns were “‘relevant to the crime of arrest,’” 
namely an illegal weapons offense.  Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 343 (2009) (quoting 
Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 632 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring in the 
judgment)).  Consequently, no Fourth Amendment violation occurred when Taylor seized 
the guns in the car. 
III 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
